Category Archives: Oil Shortages

The Fatal Cynic


Americans wake up in the year 2020 not knowing whether they are going to have pay $4 per gallon of regular, or if gasoline will be available at any price. This is one of the possible (and likely) consequences for Washington’s command decision to go gangster on an Iranian general in Iraq.

A five percent reduction in the amount of crude exports caused chaos in 1973

Because the region holds about 50% of the world’s oil reserves, the Middle East is a tempting target for great power meddling. Like everything else, what matters is how sensitively the meddles are put into play: America’s are marked by reaction, greed, lies, expensive expedients and repeat failures. This latest looks to be more of the same.

Qassem Soleimani and at least four others were blasted with Hellfire anti-tank missiles launched a day ago from a drone patrolling the skies over Baghdad airport. Ironically, one of the reasons for the ‘hit’ on Soleimani was the impulsive meddle by the US president a few months ago in October to abandon Kurdish SDF allies in northern Syria to the Turks. The GIs kept the peace between Kurds and Turks while the Kurdish forces provided a relatively safe space within Syria where US service personnel could operate, away from low-rent Iran-backed militias roaming both countries, militias that were nominally under the command of Qassem Soleimani.

Likewise, northern Kirkuk Province in Iraq, site of recent attacks on American installations, was not too long ago controlled by Kurdish forces. Northern Kirkuk is traditionally Kurdish; after the ISIS irruption in 2014, Kirkuk city itself was occupied by peshmerga fighters. In Kurdish Iraq, Americans are seen as protectors rather than enemies and are able to operate securely unlike in other parts of the country. In October, 2017, Americans watched as control of Kirkuk city and the surrounding area was ceded back to Baghdad and Iran-backed Hashd al-Shaabi militants, that is, to nobody in particular. A few US soldiers stationed as a kind of human wall between Hashd gangs and Kurds would have prevented the security vacuum that now allows militants of every kind including ISIS sleepers to operate at will.

Kurds lose = Americans lose = bandit gangs win.

After the abandonment of the Kurds, Iraqi and otherwise, the Pentagon lost relatively secure rear areas. As a consequence, the US has deemed it necessary to insert thousands more US soldiers into Iraq and Kuwait: not nearly enough to insure any kind of stability but enough to become highly visible targets. Do the math: the 100 special forces were keeping watch over the Turks were removed (to somewhere else in Syria and Iraq). About 3,500 troops have been added or are on their way to replace them. Nobody has a clear idea what are these forces supposed to do or what sort of mission they might take on. The backdrop of this is the US president’s repeated promises to extract US forces from the region.

Obviously, Soleimani was the individual responsible for his own death. As a prominent commander and political figure, it should have been obvious for him to stay under cover, to travel with the highest security, with only closest associates and security team knowing his whereabouts and itinerary at any given time; to avoid using two-way radios, cellphones or satellite phones. This sort of arrangement is not controversial, Soleimani was a high value target. Immediately after news of the attack it appeared likely that Soleimani might have been collateral damage, with Dawa party regular and militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis as the intended target. Muhandis’ Kata’ib Hezbollah group was accused of rocket attacks on Americans as well as the recently ended Baghdad embassy siege and partial takeover. It turns out Soleimani moved back and forth across the region openly with disregard for his personal safety. American intelligence largely knew where he was, strikes against him had been set in motion previously then cancelled. He was easy to track; by direct observation, by triangulating phone transmissions or by use of markers detectable by sensors on aircraft. Soleimani, a commander who had made his reputation in many wars leading from the front must have felt he was invincible or perhaps, already dead; he was a victim of victory disease or else a fatal cynic.

Soleimani was unusual as an Iranian major general in that he was competent. Incapacity is the rule for most generals everywhere. Command is an art but practitioners tend to be flatterers, gilded items like candelabras or bureaucrats. Iranian command includes dozens of highest ranking officers, almost all of them have gained their positions because of dog-like loyalty, political reliability and the absence of ambition: they hold their place due to acute survival instincts. Soleimani is accused of being behind hundreds of American military deaths, but the accusation is made out of context: the almost biblically stupid 2003 US invasion of Iraq. One can say, the Iranians should not have intervened, but the United States had no business meddling in Iraq in the first place. It is the job of every general to kill soldiers on the other side. The difficulty with most officers in the Middle East is they are better at massacring civilians regardless of whose side they are on; because they are in the way or nobody cares or the officers are psychopaths or there is some money in it for them or for political reasons. Most of the Iranian high command including Soleimani were junior officers during the Iran-Iraq war, where they learned- or unlearned their trade. The lessons were taken by Soleimani: he did not allow his troops to abuse civilians or captured prisoners. He was popular among the soldiers because he shared their hardships in the field and did not throw their lives away in pointless human wave attacks. Soleimani’s personal connections were many and widespread: he worked with everyone including the US after the invasion of Afghanistan, also Iraqi Kurdish forces, the Baghdad government, Damascus government, Russians (as part of the Syria campaign), the Lebanese; not just Hezbollah. Soleimani was instrumental in gaining Russian air support for Syrian government forces when it seemed that militants were about to overrun the Syrian army.

Soleimani was the glue that kept the Syrian Army, Hezbollah, the Russians and other militias focused against anti-government forces and ISIS rather than each other. Soleimani managed all-important Iranian logistical support for Damascus. It’s likely Soleimani was behind the ‘white glove’ policy of Damascus allowing not-quite defeated militants in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and elsewhere to remove themselves from combat zones with their families to Idlib and out of the war. Assad’s impulse would obviously been to kill all of them regardless of the cost to his own forces. He acted as a field commander leading the Syrian army and its allies to clear greater Aleppo of anti-government forces and end the siege. He later coordinated Iraqi regulars, Iran-backed militias with Kurdish- and the US air cover to remove ISIS from Tikrit in Iraq. Soleimani can’t be held harmless because of his influence during the Assadist and Russian air campaign which killed thousands of civilians, also sieges where many civilians starved. He wasn’t whacked by the US because of crimes against humanity but because he was a target of opportunity. To kill senior officers who are responsible for bombing civilian targets one would have to start with American officers: at the end of the day there wouldn’t be too many left.

Likely the greatest agony over Soleimani’s death is felt by Bashar al-Assad. Tehran will certainly dragoon some old quartermaster to make sure Assad forces have something to eat but not someone who can offer Bashar the same level of customer service as Soleimani. Absent him, the internal power struggle between Russia and Iran will veer into unmapped territory. Anything that makes Bashar weaker will encourage Erdogan to greater adventures.

Not so many are displeased Soleimani is gone. Syrian command cannot be too unhappy because his influence sidelined them within their own country. Iraqi politicians did not appreciate Soleimani’s level of influence which resulted in ascendancy of militia leaders over party regulars also military or security commanders. One of Soleimani’s ‘achievements’ was to have poorly disciplined militias given official standing as components of the Iraqi military. Iranian citizens despised Soleimani as an unreconstructed reactionary and hard liner. Rival Iranian politicians did not appreciate his international stature, his revolutionary bonafides or his connection with the top mullahs including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Israelis may not be dancing in the streets because there are always uncertainties about consequences, but Soleimani’s will not be around to further build up Iranian forces in nearby Syria or Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. It’s doubtful more than a tiny handful of Americans outside of government knew who Soleimani was.

Soleimani was dangerous but after 20 years in the Middle East saddle he was the ‘devil you knew’, he represented a certain kind of stability and predictability. He was certainly not a humanitarian but not a serial killer as portrayed by US media. Soleimani was comfortable with limits, in a way he was sharp in fighting the asymmetrical political war. It is unlikely he would have signed off on all out attacks on Americans or American interests because he knew any US response would damage the Iranian government, but he was fine with harassing and annoying them, prodding them to cut their losses and creating uncertainty. With Soleimani gone, the US and its so-called ‘allies’ have to rely on the ineptitude of militants and the mullahs, risk that swings both ways.

Strike – Counterstrike

As has been mentioned elsewhere: A large, general war across the Middle East is unlikely because none of the nations including the US can afford to fight one. Marginal oil output would be cut and the resulting finance crisis would cripple everyone. This establishes an upper bound on the level of ‘investment’ dictators and fools can make in twerking their rivals. Within limits the wars can go on, they can morph and congeal, burn out in one place and flare up in others, but exceed bounds that are poorly discerned until one crosses them … Poof! Everyone winds up living in caves!

By killing a government official and not consulting with Congress or allies beforehand, the American president foolishly jumped a whole fleet of bounds: pathetic, but not at all surprising. In a visceral and childish way the US has challenged Iranian manhood, their nationalistic blood is certainly up, also a serious need not to lose face. The Iranians have to do something: the Americans are not likely to get the senior citizen discount! Luckily, there are few American targets within easy range of Iranian guns or militants … except for one. US proxy Saudi Arabia is a sitting duck with its port facilities, oil loading platforms, desalinization plants and unprotected pipelines and other infrastructure. Closure of the Straits of Hormuz to all traffic for a couple of weeks would be cheap for Iran and amazingly effective. Will there be gasoline next week? Everybody is soon going to find out.