After months of destructive attacks by Ukrainian drones, it is becoming clear that Russia cannot protect its petroleum refineries, depots, gas pipelines and other related infrastructure.
What’s also clear is Russia currently lacks the manufacturing capacity to do more than make superficial repairs to these facilities after they are damaged.
As the Ukrainians develop larger, heavier drones with more destructive payloads, they can expand their target list to include Russian railroads, which up to now have been relatively immune to Ukrainian attacks. Expanding focus to killing Russia’s railroads – electric power substations, diesel locomotives, repair shops and depots – will starve Russian front line units, hobble what’s left of Russia’s economy and hasten an end to Putin’s war.
Russia is dependent on rail transport because of the enormous size of the Russian landmass, the relatively undeveloped conditions of the country’s roads and the unsuitability of its waterways which tend to flow north-south rather than the more useful east-west direction. Russia’s economy relies on heavy haul railroads for the movement of coal, grain and other foodstuffs, aggregates, metals, cement, cotton and heavy machinery. Excluding pipeline exports, ~90 percent of Russia’s freight goods are shipped by rail. On the military side, almost every bullet, rocket, ration, boot, rifle, spare part or vehicle makes at least part of its journey from factory to to the combat zone on a rail car, this includes material imported from North Korea, Rails additionally haul tens of millions of passengers annually.
Since the beginning of the SMO, the Ukrainians have developed the remarkable ability to smash Russia’s Last Kilometer logistics using FPV- and grenade dropping drones. Ukraine currently fields enough drones and skilled operators to be able to target everything that moves within 10 kilometers of the front line, from armored vehicles to individual infantrymen. Behind the front lines on the Russian side are kilometers-long ‘highways of death’ littered with smashed wrecks and Russian remains. These highways are stretched farther because longer range fires such as the French supplied Hammer bombs or US HIMARS make it too dangerous for Russia to bring its trains within range. This means creaky Russian road vehicles must travel long distances under fire to make the trips from rail head to front lines and back. Nevertheless, the Russians are still able to make good their losses from both these and strategic drone strikes and throw more resources into the meat grinder
Rail infrastructure has historically been considered difficult to destroy so it’s often left alone. Rail lines are linear; track breaks are quickly repaired. Ruined rolling stock is either re-railed or easily pushed aside with heavy equipment. Locomotives are robust and hard to damage. Moving trains are elusive and targeting them takes more time than is often available. Yet, the Allies proved in WWII that making the effort to kill rail traffic from the air is productive. Kill the enemies’ locomotives and supplies can’t move: armies can’t function without supplies. The Allies started purposefully hitting locomotives and rail infrastructure as part of their overall pre-Normandy air campaign starting in the Spring of 1944, By the end of the war strafing US fighter planes had destroyed over 4,500 locomotives and cut rail shipping in German-occupied France by 60%.
Railroads in Russia are operated by the state-owned holding company OAO RZD (OAO Российские железные дороги) which has close ties with the Ministry of Defense. Along with RZD’s 750,000 employees there are approximately 28,000 Railway Troops of the Russian Armed Forces, whose task is to manage the military’s rail logistics, to affect repairs, extend rail lines or build new ones and provide security. RZD puts onto its rails 7,837 main line electric freight locomotives and 3,556 diesel versions along with various short-haul shunt locomotives and passenger types which are not particularly suited to freight work; a total of about 20,000 units (2012 Annual Report from RZD, archived).
Problems with RZD predates the Ukraine war (2014): the rail administration is riddled with corruption. Most of current rail infrastructure was built during the USSR’s peak of post- WWII reconstruction. The Soviets over-engineered their systems, they are resilient. However, maintenance has been neglected largely due to corruption, and much of rail physical plant and rolling stock is antiquated. The Soviet factories that made parts for equipment are long gone with supply dependent on overseas manufacturers. Russia right now has problems finding enough locomotives and crews to meet combined commercial and wartime demand. Parts shortages and wear and tear put locomotives out of service; industries including the RZD and the army are competing against each other for manpower. The outcome for commercial clients is shipments that cannot find rail cars or trains, long delays even when trains can be had and congestion at ports and depots. All of this is without the rails being under sustained Ukrainian attack. RZD complained last fall of the possibility of “imminent collapse” due to parts problems, (Newsweek).
Russian Railways in 2023 reported that the number of trains suspended due to issues with its trains more than doubled to 42,600 amid a shortage of critical parts. This was due to “insufficient maintenance of the locomotive fleet,” Kommersant reported in March,
The shortage of trains and crews has ripple effects across the entire rail network. The flow of material on Russia’s rails is largely one-way, toward Ukraine. This leaves RZD with thousands of empty rail cars that must be put somewhere, either shipped back to their source or stashed on sidings or in marshaling yards. The east of Russia is starved of rail cars while the west is choked with them. Moving empty rail cars is not productive, another strain on the overburdened RZD.
To date, Ukrainian actions against the rails have been localized opportunistic attacks on vulnerable equipment including some trains, locomotives, substations and signal cabinets. These efforts have been successful and cost efficient but have not been sustained enough to produce a strategic outcome. Small, short range FPV and bomber drones can’t reach the trains or they lack the punch to seriously damage them. There are vulnerable targets that drones can destroy whenever the Ukrainian command chooses.
- Railroad electrical substations are low hanging fruit. A saturation drone campaign would aim to destroy them within the occupied territories, then extend 150-200 km beyond Ukraine’s eastern border. This would convert electric locomotives in these areas into giant, metal paperweights, effectively dieselizing the rail lines.
- Diesel locomotives within the occupied territories and beyond Ukraine’s eastern border are also good targets. Because of parts- and labor shortages, RZD would be forced to ‘rob Peter to pay Paul’, to commandeer replacements for destroyed diesels in other regions of Russia, locomotives it cannot spare.
- Drones would also strike repair shops, roundhouses, locomotive refueling tanks and marshaling yards; stranded locomotives, fuel tank rail cars, bridges and viaducts, port infrastructure and cargo transfer.
Electric rail substations are soft targets. These are fixed in place, out in the open; they cannot be hardened, relocated or hidden.
Russian railroad electric substation; power transformers are the four units on the right. RZD by Trent Telenko, unknown photographer
Substations use large transformers to step down high-tension generating station output to the lower voltages used by locomotive traction motors. Transformers are bathed in oil to cool them, they are vulnerable to projectiles, even rifle shots in the right place will cause them to short circuit, fault, overheat and catch fire. They are likely guarded by railroad troops against sabotage but are certainly susceptible to drones. Transformers are bespoke, hard to replace and expensive. Destroying substations would cause a real headache for the Russians as they would have to combine diesel and electric locomotives on each train to provide continuous motive power. Destroying large numbers of these substations in an area would effectively dieselize it, requiring full time use of diesel prime movers.
Here is a schematic map from Texty.org.ua: each dot is a substation. A more detailed Google map can be found here. Ukraine could begin an immediate campaign to knock out electrical substations in occupied territories There are about 30 of these all of which are in range of the larger Ukrainian drones and missiles. Afterwords, the air assault can be expanded to dieselize the entire Russian rail network in the Ukrainian theater.
Russian electrified rail lines and substations in Ukraine theater, by Texty
Diesel locomotives use a large engine to drive a generator that provides electric power to the traction motors. Hitting the fuel tank on one of these locomotives can trigger an intense fire able to burn out the locomotive, necessitating a total rebuild. The fuel tank is the Achilles heel of the diesel locomotive.
Dozens of diesel locomotives lined up at a Russian locomotive repair facility,begging to be hit by ATACMS. Russian media unknown photographer
Facilities such as repair shops, parts warehouses, locomotive round houses and refueling stations are even softer targets than substations. Hitting these targets would have the effect of compromising the readiness of the entire locomotive fleet across Russia as RZD does not have ‘spare’ facilities. Like refineries and arsenals, Russian rail support infrastructure cannot be relocated: they are where they are for the proper functioning of the system. Unlike the refineries and arsenals, rail facilities don’t receive much in the way of air defense. The geographic sprawl of Russia’s rail offers too many targets for Kremlin to do much with, as defending facilities in any particular locale would leave others exposed.
Hitting rails in a systematic way would put RZD and the entire Russian economy into crisis mode. This isn’t some sort of advanced railroad- or military engineering, it’s simple math. Destroying substations in the Ukraine theater would strand hundreds of electric locomotives. These would have to be retrieved to be put into service elsewhere, but there are too few diesels in the Russian inventory to replace them. The retrieval process would be time consuming and dangerous; it would expose more of RZD’s fleet to drones. Transport capacity across Russia would shrink. RZD preemptively shifting to all-diesel in the vital Ukraine theater would likewise fail for this reason, such a shift would represent a voluntary reduction of transport capacity – an anathema to the Kremlin.
Attacking the rails would leave Russian formations farthest from Russia in Kherson and Crimea vulnerable. The demise of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and Ukrainian control over the waters surrounding Crimea has left the MoD with the choice of ‘trains or nothing.’ Russians in this area have supply problems now, and that is with train service. Remove trains and and Russians would have to consider withdrawal or at least reduction of their forces. Russians offensives in Donbas and elsewhere are sustainable only because they are close to rail lines and continuous resupply. It is by rail that Russia is able to stumble along as it does; unable to mount strategic offensives but able to bleed Kyiv forces by attrition.
Attacking Russian rails directly shifts Russian tactical-operational goals away from maintaining its campaign inside Ukraine toward keeping its supply lines open inside Russia. Even if parts of the rail infrastructure survive a Ukrainian blitz, Moscow cannot assume the rest will continue to do so going forward meaning efforts to defend the rails would have to be permanently sustained. The Russians would be forced to reconfigure operations from offensive to defensive, surrendering initiative to Ukraine. Attacking Russian rail would serve to relieve pressure on the Ukraine’s front-line drone units. The outcome is a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle for Kyiv. Russian supply would be reduced by destruction of rail capacity opening targets to Ukrainian attack that are currently out of range – such as more of Russia’s rails.
Ukrainian long range drone ‘Bober’. Photo:twitter.com.serhiyprytula
Ukraine attacking rails is not an original idea. Western analysts have promoted the strategy on social media since 2022. Ukraine has enjoyed successes near Kyiv, Lyman and elsewhere by cutting rail lines and smashing Russian logistics. Various groups including Russian partisans have taken action against the rail system and even Ukrainian drone operators, but not in a systematic way. Maybe the Americans labeled Russian rail infrastructure ‘civilian targets’, off limits to long range attacks. Certainly those limits are gone, the Russians are vulnerable, a sustained effort against RZD would knock Russia out of the war.